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In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as 
early as the beginning of the second year of law school, for positions 
commencing approximately two years down the road.  In the new hiring 
regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast, judges are exhorted to 
follow a set of start dates for considering and hiring applicants during the 
fall of the third year of law school.  Using the same general methodology 
as we employed in a study of the market for federal judicial law clerks 
conducted in 1998-2000, we have broadly surveyed both federal appellate 
judges and law students about their experiences of the new market for law 
clerks.  This Essay analyzes our findings within the prevailing economic 
framework for studying markets with tendencies toward “early” hiring – a 
framework we both draw upon and modify in the course of our analysis.  
Our data make clear that the movement of the clerkship market back to the 
third year of law school is highly valued by judges, but we also find that a 
strong majority of the judges responding to our surveys has concluded that 
non-adherence to the specified start dates is very substantial – a 
conclusion we are able to corroborate with specific quantitative data from 
both judge and student surveys.  The consistent experience of a wide range 
of other markets suggests that such non-adherence in the law clerk market 
will lead to either a reversion to very early hiring or the use of a 
centralized matching system such as that used for medical residencies.   
We suggest, however, potential avenues by which the clerkship market 
could stabilize at something like its present pattern of mixed adherence 
and non-adherence, thereby avoiding the complete abandonment of the 
current system.   
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[T]though I knew it was coming and I knew it would be bad, I had no idea just how 
[bad]. 
−2004 applicant for federal judicial clerkship
1 
 
I received the offer via voicemail while I was in flight to my second interview.  The judge 
actually left three messages.  First, to make the offer.  Second, to tell me that I should 
respond soon.  Third, to rescind the offer.  It was a 35 minute flight. 
−2004 applicant for federal judicial clerkships
2 
 
It’s sad (pathetic?) that judges aren’t obeying their own rules.  [It] flies in the face of the 
whole notion of ‘law and order.’   
−2005 applicant for federal judicial clerkships
3 
 
One of [Judge X's] clerks even chastised me for ‘overly stringent adherence to this 
timeline they have’ and noted that other students from my school were willing to 
interview ahead of schedule. It was a real conflict for me. I felt like I had to choose 
between cheating and (potentially) not getting a clerkship. 
                                                              −2005 applicant for federal judicial clerkships
4 
 
It’s very disheartening to see so many Federal judges – the ostensible paragons of rules 
and fair play – breaking their own rules and scheduling interviews before the agreed-
upon date in the law clerk hiring plan.  I expected better. 
−2005 applicant for federal judicial clerkships
5 
 
The cheating continues.  I have brought this to the attention of the committee but do not 
even get the courtesy of a reply. 
−Federal appellate judge, 2005
6 
 
*  *     * 
It’s terrible.  Just about anything, including malicious lies, forcible running with scissors, 
and active misuse of electric cords, would be better. 
     −1999 applicant for federal judicial clerkships
7 
 
You will have to arrest me before I will again set foot in [specified courthouse].  I would 
not wish this process on my worst enemy. 
−2000 applicant for federal judicial clerkships
8 
 
  [T]he current non-system makes applicants see judges behaving in ways which are 
unseemly, to put it mildly.  That view of our behavior will inevitably shape what these 
people  think  of  the  judiciary.   To the extent that many of these applicants  will  become 
leaders in the bar and in politics, we will as judges reap what we have sown.  They will 
hold us in contempt and will not be wholly wrong. 
         −Federal appellate judge, 1999
9 
                                                 
1   2004 Student Survey #254.  For further information about our surveys, see the text 
and Appendix of this Essay. 
2   2005 Student Survey #132 (parentheses omitted). 
3   2005 Student Survey #147. 
4   2005 Student Survey #93. 
5   2005 Student Survey #193. 
6   2005 Judge Survey #80. 
7   See Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner and Alvin E. Roth, The 
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 793, 838 (2001) (hereinafter  
“AJPR”). 
8   See id. at 839. 
9   See id. at 835.   2 
 
 
*     *     * 
 
  As the new millennium dawned, the market for federal judicial law clerks 
was in a state of near crisis.  The final two clerkship applicants and federal 
appellate judge quoted above, as well as many others like them, expressed deep 
and wide-ranging concerns with the functioning of this market in 1998-2000.
10  In 
an attempt to gain some control, in March of 2002 a group of prominent federal 
appellate judges organized a one-year moratorium on the hiring of federal judicial 
law clerks; federal judges were requested to skip hiring entirely in 2002 and were 
then to resume hiring in the fall of 2003, with the primary pool of candidates the 
now third-year students who under past practice would have been hired in the fall 
of 2002.
11  Likewise in subsequent years judges were to hire students during the 
fall of the third year of law school.
12  This new system for the hiring of clerks is 
structured around a set of “start dates” for the transmission of applications, the 
scheduling and conduct of interviews, and the making of offers.
13 
 
The law clerk market that is the subject of this regulatory regime is widely 
viewed as important both to the functioning of the federal court system and to the 
career paths of lawyers.  Many judges believe that clerk quality has a significant 
effect on judges’ productivity and, thus, presumably on the functioning of the 
federal court system.
14  With respect to lawyers’ career paths, federal court 
clerkships provide invaluable knowledge and experience to clerks, who will often 
spend much of their professional careers arguing before these courts.
15  Federal 
court clerkships are also often critical stepping stones to elite legal posts including 
Supreme Court clerkships, teaching jobs at top-ranked law schools, and the most 
competitive law firm positions, and many law firms pay substantial cash signing 
bonuses to former law clerks, ranging from about $40,000 for court of appeals 
clerks to as much as $200,000 for Supreme Court law clerks.
16  A series of law 
review articles over the years in the Yale Law Journal, the University of Chicago 
                                                 
10   See id. at 834-45 for extensive descriptions based on survey evidence from both 
federal appellate judges and clerkship applicants. 
11   See Memorandum, “Law Clerk Hiring by Federal Appellate Judges” (March 2002). 
12   See e.g.,  
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/bin/Lawclerk/Lawclerkpdf/Summary_of_the_Plan_for_20
04.PDF (regime for fall of 2004) (visited 10/25/06);   
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/hr/lc_hiring_plan.pdf (regime for fall of 2005) (visited 
10/25/06); http://fedcir.gov/lawclerk.html (regime for fall of 2006) (visited 10/25/06). 
13   See sources cited supra note 13. 
14   See Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 152, 153 (1990). 
15   See, e.g., id. at 153-54 (describing the various legal roles that clerks play in judicial 
chambers). 
16   See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 Yale L.J. 1707, 1709 
(1991) (clerkships as stepping stones to elite legal posts); Charles Lane, Former Clerks’ 
Signing Bonuses Rival Salaries on the High Court, Washington Post, May 15, 2006, at 
A15.   3 
 
Law Review, and other leading journals has analyzed the recurrent difficulties 
experienced by the law clerk market.
17 
 
The current regime for hiring federal judicial law clerks is a substantial 
departure from the system (or “non-system”) in effect in this important market 
prior to the 2002 moratorium, and thus it is important to inquire into the operation 
of the new regime.  As was the case at the time of a study we conducted in 1998-
2000 of the clerkship market under the pre-moratorium regime,
18 anecdotal 
impressions are widespread, but hard data are missing.  Accordingly, following 
the fall 2004 and fall 2005 clerkship hiring seasons, we surveyed both federal 
appellate judges and law students about this issue, using the same general 
approach we took in our earlier study.  We describe our survey methodology in 
the Appendix to this Essay.   
 
The responses to our new surveys provide clear evidence of three 
important points about the operation of the present system.  First, as we expected, 
the movement of the market back to the third year of law school is highly praised 
by judges responding to our surveys.  The move in timing is a significant 
advantage of the current system.
19  After offering a basic framework for analysis 
of the clerkship market in Part I, we present in Part II our survey evidence on the 
additional information that is made available by the backward movement in 
timing and on judges’ reaction to this beneficial feature of the new system. 
 
Our second main finding about the current regime is more troubling.  As 
we describe in Part III, our survey responses reveal a level of interviewing and 
offering of positions prior to the specified start dates that we find surprising (even 
in light of the many anecdotal accounts with which we are familiar).  Our surveys 
of federal appellate judges and law students provide a quantitative lens on the 
frequency of such behavior, and the picture suggests widespread non-adherence to 
the start dates.  In particular, we find that in both 2004 and 2005 more than half of 
                                                 
17   See AJPR, supra note; Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer, and Guido Calabresi, 
The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 
Yale L.J. 207 (1994); Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: the Judicial 
Clerk Selection Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 Georgetown L.J. 1749 
(1995); Richard A. Epstein, Ending the Mad Scramble: An Experimental Matching Plan 
for Federal Clerkships, 10 Green Bag 37 (2006); Kozinski, supra note; Abner Mikva, 
Judicial Clerkships: A Judge’s View, 36 J. Legal Educ. 150 (1986); Louis F. Oberdorfer 
& Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to the Bad Apple, 101 Yale L.J. 
1097 (1992); Wald, supra note. 
18   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 807-12. 
19   While we were not at all surprised by this finding, not all observers agree on this 
point.  Professor George Priest, who has written a lengthy article on the clerkship market, 
questions whether earlier hiring is a problem for judges.  See George L. Priest, 
Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets, 22 
Yale J. Reg. 123, 157 (2005).  Our data paint a picture different from the one he suggests.  
See infra Part II.   4 
 
responding judges had concluded that either “a substantial number of appellate 
judges did not adhere” or (even worse) “few appellate judges adhered” to the start 
dates for conducting interviews and making offers.  And even more directly, as 
early as the fall of 2004, a third of judges reported on their survey responses that 
they themselves had commenced interviewing prior to the specified start date for 
conducting interviews; and just under a quarter of judges reported on their survey 
responses that they had commenced making offers prior to the specified start date 
for making offers.  Despite this degree of non-adherence, it is certainly possible to 
imagine ways in which the clerkship market could stabilize at a point of modest, 
albeit highly imperfect, adherence to the start dates, and – expanding upon 
existing economic analyses of other markets with marked tendencies toward early 
hiring – we offer several theories (along with relevant data from our survey 
responses) along these lines in Part III.   
 
Our third set of findings concerns the rapidity with which clerkship 
matches are made under the present regime – in significant part as a result of the 
use of “exploding offers” in the law clerk hiring process.  Part IV discusses our 
survey evidence on the quantitative importance of these short-fuse offers, which 
require students to act on clerkship offers extremely quickly, often before they 
can determine whether more preferred judges with whom they have interviews 
will end up offering them positions.  (The student whose offer was both made and 
retracted during a 35-minute airplane flight provides a particularly extreme 
example,
20 though, as noted in Part IV, other students’ experiences were even 
more extreme.)  Part IV also presents further evidence of the high speed at which 
the market for clerks operates under the present regime.  As we will discuss, at 
least in other markets, such high levels of market compression tend to lead many 
participants to move before the market’s designated start dates in an effort to 
avoid the congestion.
21  Again, however, we use economic analysis to sketch 
potential ways in which the market for federal judicial law clerks might avoid this 
outcome and, thus, achieve at least partial success in keeping clerk hiring in the 




                                                 
20   See text accompanying supra note 3. 
21 For a discussion of market congestion, and how it led to against-the-rules before-market 
transactions in the labor market for psychologists, see Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin. Xing  
"Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing:  Decentralized Matching in the Market for 
Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, 105, April 1997,  284-329. 
22   As discussed below, many commentators have looked favorably upon such a 
centralized matching system.  (And our own prior study recommended the adoption of a 
variant of this system, while outlining some of the difficulties that would have to be 
overcome in implementing it.)  See infra note.  However, judges have never chosen to so 
much as experiment with such a system, despite the recurrent and severe problems the 
law clerk market has experienced over nearly a quarter century.  See infra part II.A.  
Thus, a reasonable inference is that judges (if not applicants) prefer to avoid moving to a 
centralized matching system if at all possible.   5 
 
 
I.  Normative Framework 
 
Our primary normative concerns in analyzing the market for federal 
judicial law clerks will be how well this market succeeds in maximizing the total 
satisfaction of judges and applicants with their clerkship matches and how well 
this market performs in encouraging participants to conform with, rather than 
flout, its rules.
23  Does the market do a good job matching up judges with 
candidates who are both of interest to, and interested in, these judges?  If not, then 
the foundational efficiency generally associated with a well-functioning market 
will not be realized.
24  Does the market make it safe for judges and applicants to 
participate in an orderly fashion?  If not, then – at least if the past history of the 
law clerk market is any guide – participants’ resistance to the market is likely to 
grow rapidly over time.
25 
 
To be sure, arguably an ideal measure of how well the market for federal 
judicial law clerks is working is the degree to which it contributes maximally to 
the “production of justice”
26 – a metric that, unlike the measure noted above of 
the satisfaction of judges and applicants with their clerkship matches, takes into 
account the overall quality of the legal system, including effects on those who are 
not participants in the clerkship market.  It is possible, for instance, that failing to 
match the most desired clerkship candidates to the most desired judges – that is, 
failing to match in accordance with the parties’ preferences – actually improves 
the “production of justice” by harnessing the abilities of superior clerks to 
relatively less desired judges.
27  Other effects are imaginable as well.  Perhaps it is 
the case that top law clerks benefit more from the coaching or the professional 
networks of more desirable judges, and this may produce broader benefits for 
society as these clerks pursue their own careers in the law after their clerkships.
28  
However, because it is impossible as a practical matter to say how “mismatches” 
(from the perspective of judges’ and applicants’ preferences) affect the overall 
quality of the legal system, our analysis focuses on the two criteria noted above. 
 
In analyzing the clerkship market, two distinct attributes of the hiring 
process are important: the time at which hiring occurs in the applicant’s law 
                                                 
23   Because the clerkship market at the time of our prior study did not specify rules 
governing the timing of transactions, we focused on the criterion of maximizing judges’ 
and applicants’ satisfaction and did not address incentives to conform to, versus flout, 
such rules.  See AJPR, supra note 7, at 798-805. 
24   See generally id. at 800-04. 
25   See generally text accompanying supra notes 1-6. 
26   AJPR, supra note 7, at 804. 
27   See id.  
28   See id.   6 
 
school career and the nature of the hiring process itself.
 29  We consider these two 




A. Timing  of  Hiring 
 
Under the regime that prevailed for hiring federal judicial law clerks prior 
to the current reform, clerks were hired on the basis of only a single year’s 
performance in law school, or one-third of the total time needed to obtain a law 
degree.  Moving the hiring date for clerks later is preferable to the degree that 
information that emerges after the first year of law school is relevant to judges’ 
and clerks’ satisfaction with the match.
31  Early as opposed to late hiring means 
that judges have less information of various sorts on which to base their decisions 
about which clerks would be most attractive to them.  Similarly, with early hiring 
students have less information about whether and where they are interested in 
clerking; indeed, our prior study offered evidence that the then-prevailing early 
time for clerkship hiring discouraged some students from applying at all.
32   
 
Counterbalancing the informational loss from early hiring is the benefit 
that parties may enjoy from resolving uncertainty earlier and, in effect, insuring 
themselves against the possibility that things could turn out badly for them.
33  As 
we pointed out in our prior study, however, no one seems to suggest that students 
should be admitted to college based on sixth-grade test scores in order to “insure” 
                                                 
29   See id. at 798. 
30   For purposes of analysis, it is useful to keep these two attributes of the clerk hiring 
process separate.  See Hao Li and Sherwin Rosen, Unraveling in Matching Markets, 88 
Am. Econ. Rev. 371, 371-72 (1998) (discussing the distinction between how early 
transactions occur and strategic behavior in transactions).   
It also bears noting for purposes of our analysis that salaries of law clerks are not 
set by the judges who hire them.  For analyses of matching in contexts in which salaries 
are flexible, see Hao Li and Wing Suen, Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting, 
108 J. Pol. Econ. 1058 (2000); Wing Suen, A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and 
Disequilibrium Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching, 31 Rand J. Econ. 101 (2000).   
However, many of the inefficiency results apply both to matching with fixed salaries and 
to matching with flexible salaries. See, for example, Roth and Xing, supra note 28, at 
1034-35.  Thus, we do not agree with Professor Priest’s suggestion that the fact that law 
clerk salaries are fixed rather than set by individual judges is what produces the problems 
with timing of transactions in this market.  See Priest, supra note 19, at 184. Particularly 
problematic for Professor Priest’s view is the demonstration that markets in which prices 
move freely may not only unravel, but do so at considerable cost to efficiency: see the 
demonstration of this in the market for post-season college football bowl games in 
Guillaume Fréchette, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver, “Unraveling Yields Inefficient 
Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls,” 2007, working paper. 
31   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 802. 
32   See id. at 833-34 and Table A7. 
33   See Li and Rosen, supra note 29, at 372.   7 
 
students against not turning out as well as they might hope.
34  It seems equally 
unclear to us why such insurance would on balance be desirable in the context of 
federal court clerkships.
35  Consistent with this suggestion, existing analyses of 
the market for federal judicial law clerks have generally taken the view that hiring 
substantially later than the beginning of the second year of law school is 




B.  Nature of the Hiring Process 
 
Well-functioning markets are valuable in large part because they bring 
together many buyers and sellers at the same time, thereby enabling these actors 
to consider a range of possible transactions.
37  Parties are more likely to be 
satisfied with their match when they have been able to gather information about 
multiple options and act on that information to seek out their most preferred 
alternatives.  When markets are thin or nonexistent, parties must choose from a 
very small set of alternatives or, in some cases, may not have a choice at all.
38 
 
An extreme example of thin markets, not available at the time of our prior 
study, comes from the recent experience of the market for gastroenterology 
fellows.
39  Over a period of years this market developed into one in which offers 
                                                 
34   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 804. 
35   See id. 
36   See, e.g., Becker, Breyer and Calabresi, supra note, at 223-24 (describing the harms 
of early hiring); Oberdorfer and Levy, supra note, at 1100 (describing the benefits of 
uniform hiring in the fall of students’ third year of law school).  Professor Priest points 
out that it is not entirely clear whether, or why, a particular point substantially later than 
the beginning of the second year of law school, but before the end of the third year, is the 
precisely optimal time for the hiring of federal judicial law clerks.  See Priest, supra note 
19, at 152.  It may indeed be difficult to identify the precisely optimal time for hiring to 
occur, but our suggestion in the text is simply that, in the judgment of most observers, the 
gap between the beginning of the second year of law school and the start of employment 
as a law clerk after graduation two years later is much too large to be optimal. 
37    See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and 
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 992, 992 
(1994). 
38   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 850-58, for many examples of this sort of dynamic.     
39   See generally Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth, Unraveling Reduces 
Mobility in a Labor Market:  Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized 
Match, 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1342 (2003);  Muriel Niederle, Deborah D. Proctor and 
Alvin E. Roth, What Will Be Needed for the New GI Fellowship Match To 
Succeed? 130 Gastroenterology 218 (2006). In this and related markets it was also 
observed that the presence or absence of a centralized match did not influence 
wages: see Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, “Relationship Between Wages 
and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships,” JAMA. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 9, September 3, 2003, 1153-1154   8 
 
had to be acted upon extremely rapidly, without the chance to consider and 
compare available alternatives.
40  The result was that the market became less 
national, and more local, with fewer and fewer applicants changing city or state to 
take their positions.
41  Thus many participants’ “markets” shrunk effectively to 
the participant’s immediate geographic area.
42 
 
Historically, clerkship applicants have likewise faced extremely thin 
markets.  Indeed, “in many instances the sellers [of clerkship services] can 
consider only one possible transaction – the one with the judge who first makes 
them an offer.”
43  In the absence of a very reliable pre-market sorting mechanism 
to pair clerkship applicants with their top choices among those judges interested 
in them, such thin market are extremely unlikely to maximize the total satisfaction 
of judges and clerks with the match; instead they will produce a substantial 
number of “unstable” matches in which some judges and applicants not matched 
to one another would have preferred to have been matched together.  And such 
thin markets also tend to produce a general degree of disorderliness in the market 
that, in turn, encourages intense resistance among market participants.
44   
 
Of course, as suggested just above, if participants are able to obtain all or 
essentially all the information they need to make optimal choices prior to the 
interviewing and offer stage, then the cost of very thin markets is far less.  While 
it is ultimately an empirical question – one that our survey data cannot resolve – 
whether participants in the market for federal judicial law clerks can perfectly or 
nearly perfectly sort themselves prior to the first interview (so that there is little 
cost to quick pairing off at this point), most analyses have assumed that there are 
important limits on participants’ ability to sort themselves perfectly before the 
commencement of the interview and offer stage, given the highly personal nature 




II.  Evidence on the Timing of Hiring 
 
As described in the introduction, in fall of 2004 and fall of 2005 we 
surveyed both federal appellate judges and students at four elite law schools in an 
effort to determine how the current clerkship regime is operating.  In this Part we 
discuss the evidence from our surveys of judges’ views about the move from 
                                                 
40   See Niederle and Roth, supra note, at 1346. 
41   See id. at 1349-50. 
42   See id. 
43   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 801. 
44   See generally text accompanying supra notes 1-6. 
45   See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 17, at 1711 (describing critical information 
discernable only during the interview); Oberdorfer and Levy, supra note 34, at 1108 
(lamenting the clerkship market forces that “prevent participants from receiving full 
information and from maximizing their preferences”).    9 
 
hiring law clerks at the beginning of the second year of law school to hiring law 
clerks at the beginning of the third year of law school.  We emphasize judges’ 
responses because their repeat player status made them the more natural recipients 
of questions comparing the present regime for clerk hiring to the regime in effect 
prior to the 2002 moratorium.  The Appendix to this Essay provides details about 
the content, distribution, and response rates of both the judge surveys and the 
student surveys; as we note there, while our surveys were not professionally 
designed instruments (for instance, were not pre-tested on subsamples of 
respondents), we obtained good response rates and gathered information (from the 
surveys’ highly educated recipients) consisting mostly of answers to 
straightforward factual questions. 
 
That judges prefer hiring in the third year of law school to hiring in the 
second year of law school is certainly not a surprising finding (neither to us, nor 
to the judges who in the past argued for a delay until the third year)
46 – and it is 
indeed what our survey responses reveal.  One piece of evidence on judges’ 
reaction to the timing of hiring under the current versus pre-moratorium regimes 
comes from direct questions on our judge surveys about whether judges preferred 
the current regime to the regime in effect prior to 2002; interpreted in light of 
their later written comments (described just below), a fair inference is that the 
judges who preferred the current regime did so in significant part because of the 
later time of hiring.  In quantitative terms, more than 80% of the judges 
responding to our comparative question about the two clerk hiring regimes in both 
fall of 2004 and fall of 2005 indicated a preference for the current regime over the 
one in effect prior to 2002.  See Table 1.   
 
Table 1:  Judges’ Comparison of Current and Prior Law Clerk Hiring 
Regimes 
   
  fall of 2004  fall of 2005 
Number and (in parentheses) percentage of responding 





Number and (in parentheses) percentage of responding 





Number and (in parentheses) percentage of responding 





Total number of responses to question about former 
and current law clerk hiring regimes 
112 81 
Sources:  2004 Judge Survey; 2005 Judge Survey.   
 
 
In terms of the written remarks, a number of write-in comments in 
response to the open-ended question, “Is there anything else that comes to mind 
about your experience of the clerkship hiring process that you would like to share 
                                                 
46   As noted above, Professor Priest has a different view.  See supra note 19.   10 
 
with us?,” emphasized a strong preference for the later hiring time under the new 
regime, as shown in Table 2.   11 
 






We much prefer hiring 3
rd yr students. 
2004 Survey 
#50 
The present system is working - it is far better than when we were 
fighting to hire as soon as law review selections were made. 
2004 Survey 
#64 
[T]he system as a whole was improved by a single factor:  moving 
the interview/hiring year from 2L to 3L. 
2004 Survey 
#75 




The new system is much better than the old.  I had just sent a memo 
to all the judges on my court saying I was going to hire only 3Ls and 
graduates when the new rules were proposed. 
2004 Survey 
#92 
The plusses of interviewing/hiring in 3d year are substantial and 
worth resisting the cheaters and playing by the rules. 
2005 Survey 
#34 
[T]he additional information is great. 
2005 Survey 
#56  
We greatly like waiting until 2nd year grades [and] law review 
positions [are] determined. 
2005 Survey 
#99 
It is a vast improvement to consider 3rd year applicants. 
Sources:  2004 Judge Survey; 2005 Judge Survey. 
 
A further question on our judge surveys provides insight into the specific 
benefits to judges from a later time of hiring.  We listed a series of types of 
information about clerk applicants and asked judges whether they found each of 
the types of information that was of value to them more available under the new 
regime than under the old.  Essentially all of the judges responding to this 
question (97% averaging across the two years) found at least one type of 
information that was of value to them to be more available under the new regime 
(Table 3).  As shown in the table, the types of information most often selected by 
judges as valuable to them and more available under the new regime were law 
school grades (93% of responses across the two years) and recommendations 
from familiar professors (71% of responses across the two years).    12 
 
Table 3:  Information That Was of Value to Judges and 
More Available Under the Current Regime than Under the Pre-Moratorium 
Regime 
 
  fall of 2004  fall of 2005 
Number and (in parentheses) percentage of responding 
judges who stated that least one type of information of 







Number and (in parentheses) percentage of responding 
judges who stated that law school grades were of value 







Number and (in parentheses) percentage of responding 
judges who stated that recommendations from familiar 





Total number of responses to question about whether 
information that was of value was more available 
under the new regime than under the old regime 
105 71 
Sources:  2004 Judge Survey; 2005 Judge Survey.   
* Two judges indicated in their 2005 surveys that information of value was more 
available under the new clerkship regime but did not indicate which type of information 
of value was more available.  These responses are not included in the starred tabulations, 
so total number of responses used for these tabulations is 69.  
  
 
Overall, then, our judge survey responses provide unambiguous evidence 
of the fact that almost all judges prefer later hiring to earlier hiring.  Of course 
there is an ambiguity in the use of the word “preference” in this context.  Ideally, 
all judges would prefer to hire late so that they have more information about the 
applicants, but by their behavior some judges reveal a preference for somewhat 
earlier hiring to steal a march on the other judges.  Some of these judges might be 
worse off in a system in which there were no opportunities for strategic timing of 
the hiring decision.  What our data tell us in clear terms, however, is that, ignoring 
strategic aspects, most judges strongly prefer hiring sometime in the third year of 
law school to hiring early in the second year of law school. 
 
We turn now to the more controversial issue of just how much adherence 
versus non-adherence there is among federal appellate judges to the set of start 
dates established by the current regime for the hiring of federal judicial law 
clerks, and to the lessons of other markets and of economic analysis for the 




III.  Adherence to Start Dates 
 
Although the current regime for law clerk hiring was initially instituted as 
a one-year moratorium on law clerk hiring, after the end of the moratorium the   13 
 
plan is obviously equivalent to the regimes – familiar from both the past 
experience of the law clerk market and the experiences of many other markets
47 – 
of instituting a start date or set of start dates before which specified market 
interactions should not take place.  In this Part, we briefly review the history of 
start dates in various markets and then describe the evidence from our judge and 
student surveys on how well market participants adhered to the start dates in 
effect in the law clerk market in fall of 2004 and fall of 2005.  After presenting 
the data, we use economic analysis to assess possible avenues by which the law 
clerk market might stabilize at something like its present pattern of mixed 
adherence and non-adherence, and thereby achieve at least partial success in 




A.  Historical Experience with Start Dates in the Law Clerk Market and 
Beyond 
 
As recounted in an article by Judge Becker, Justice Breyer, and Judge 
Calabresi, attempts to set start dates in the market for federal judicial law clerks 
date back nearly a quarter century.
49  These previous attempts to sustain start-date 
regimes provide illuminating context for our discussion below of the experience 
with start dates in recent years under the current system for hiring federal judicial 
law clerks. 
 
In 1983 the Judicial Conference instituted a start date for applications of 
September 15 of the third year of law school – strikingly similar to the one in 
effect under the current regime.
50  After reports of “rampant” departures, 
however, the date was abandoned the following year.
51  A second attempt at 
fixing a start date for the law clerk market came with a 1986 effort to fix a date of 
April 1 of the second year of law school for commencing the review of 
applications; but, once again, many judges failed to adhere, and, again, the 
attempt was abandoned as a failure.
52  Next, in 1989, Judge Becker and then-
Judge Breyer proposed a March 1 start date for the conducting of interviews; this, 




The next attempt came one year later, when more than two-thirds of 
federal appellate judges agreed that no offers would be made prior to May 1 (at 
                                                 
47   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 850-55, for descriptions. 
48   For further discussion of the matching system possibility, see infra note. 
49   See Becker, Breyer and Calabresi, supra note 34, at 209. 
50   See id. 
51   See id. 
52   See id. 
53   See id.   14 
 
12:00 noon Eastern Daylight Time) of students’ second year of law school.
54 
(Review of applications and interviewing of candidates could take place at any 
time.)  This approach ended up eliciting broad condemnation for its 
encouragement of “unspoken” agreements between judges and clerks prior to 
May 1; its penalizing of judges who called applicants promptly at 12:00 noon 
only to learn they had already accepted offers from judges with “fast” watches; 
and its devastating effect on judges who did not demand on-the-spot responses to 
offers made at or shortly after 12:00 noon on May 1, only to discover that if offers 




Not until 1993 was the next attempt made at a start date in the law clerk 
market.  The 1993 regime involved the imposition of a March 1 start date for 
clerkship interviews and initially appeared more promising than the prior efforts.  
Indeed, its sponsors stated hopefully after its first year of operation that although 
“[w]e entertain no illusions that the March 1 Solution is perfect, . . . we 
respectfully submit that, like democracy with all its flaws, it is the best system 
that anyone has conceived thus far.”
 56  However, with the passage of time, more 
and more judges were interviewing and making offers prior to the March 1 start 
date, and in 1998 the Judicial Conference abandoned the March 1 regime because 
it was “not universally followed and, therefore . . . not an accurate reflection of 
the practice in the courts.”
57 
 
The basic reason the law clerk market has experienced difficulty in 
making start dates stick is that individual market participants stand to gain from 
hiring slightly earlier than the specified start date, and such deviations have 
ultimately led to the unraveling of the start date.  A judge’s survey response in our 
prior study expresses the underlying dynamic perfectly: 
 
I live in…, and my office is located in…, a country town . . . .  [I]t 
is not every young man or woman who will come here to live; 
indeed, most won’t. . . .  [Initially] I did not employ law clerks 
until they had finished the first term of their senior year of law 
school. . . .  I soon found out that it was more and more difficult to 
                                                 
54   See id. at 210. 
55   See id. at 210-11 
56   Id. at 222. 
57   Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 38 (Sept. 
15, 1998).  The regime in effect from 1993-1998 was the last judicially-instituted attempt 
to regulate the law clerk market prior to the current regime.  However, for one year 
following the Judicial Conference’s abandonment of the March 1 start date, “some law 
schools attempted to enforce a February 1 start date for sending application materials, 
including faculty recommendations, to judges, but these efforts were largely abandoned 
the following year (as well as somewhat ignored in the year in which they were 
nominally in effect).”  AJPR, supra note 7, at 806.   15 
 
get law clerks from the top of the class. . . .  But I have found that 
there are a few people in the top of the class at most law schools 
who had rather be assured of a job early, even in a town this size, 
than to wait and enter the contest in becoming clerks for judges in 
the larger cities with the larger and better-advertised reputations.
58 
 
Judge Alex Kozinski concurs, noting that “From the judge’s perspective, making 
an early offer allows him to . . . attract candidates who might not otherwise 
seriously consider him for a clerkship.”
59 
 
The law clerk market is far from alone in its historical inability to sustain a 
start-date regime.  Indeed, we are aware of no market that has successfully 
maintained a start-date regime for an extended period – a point we documented 
at some length in our prior article.
60  Of course, this does not mean the law clerk 
market could not be an exception; and we see no way other than empirical inquiry 
to examine this possibility.  The next section discusses what our survey responses 
show about adherence to the specified start dates in fall of 2004 and fall of 2005. 
 
 
B.  Evidence on Adherence to Start Dates  
 
The current regime for hiring federal law clerks specifies two critical start 
dates, the calendar dates of which, for 2004, 2005, and 2006, we provide in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4:  Start Date Regime for Law Clerk Hiring – Calendar Dates 
 
Step of the hiring 
process 
Calendar date in 
fall of 2004 
Calendar date in 
fall of 2005 
Calendar date 
in fall of 2006 
Scheduling of interviews  Monday, Sept. 13  Thursday, Sept. 15 
(noon EDT) 
Thursday, Sept. 
14 (noon EDT) 
Conduct of interviews 
and making of offers 




04.PDF (regime for fall of 2004) (visited 10/25/06);   
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/hr/lc_hiring_plan.pdf (regime for fall of 2005) (visited 
10/25/06); http://fedcir.gov/lawclerk.html (regime for fall of 2006) (visited 10/25/06). 
 
  
In discussing the evidence from our judge and student surveys on 
adherence to these start dates, we note that for both judge and student surveys, 
any selection bias in our response pool is most likely to bias against finding 
                                                 
58   Id. at 795-96 (quoting a statement from a judge survey) (emphasis added). 
59   Kozinski, supra note 17, at 1720. 
60   See AJRP, supra note 7, at 852-55, 862.   16 
 
departures from the specified start dates, as those who do not adhere are probably 
less eager to report their behavior on a survey. 
 
Tables 5a and 5b report the results of a series of questions on our judge 
surveys about judges’ knowledge of adherence or non-adherence to the start dates 
for the law clerk market.  In fall of 2004, 46% of responding judges stated that 
either a substantial number of appellate judges did not adhere or few appellate 
judges adhered to the start dates for conducting interviews and making offers 
(Table 5a).  In fall of 2005, the number was still higher; 58% of responding 
judges stated that either a substantial number of appellate judges did not adhere or 
few appellate judges adhered to the start dates for conducting interviews and 
making offers (Table 5b).
61    
 
                                                 
61   We do not suggest that this evidence implies an increase in the total level of non-
adherence between 2004 and 2005 because our response pools in the two years may have 
differed in some systematic way (a possibility that is particularly likely given that our 
response rates were different in the two years).  If, however, non-adherence did increase 
between fall of 2004 and fall of 2005, then the change would be particularly notable 
because the degree of constraint upon judges was actually lower in an important respect 
in fall of 2005 than in fall of 2004.  This is so because in fall of 2004 interviewing or 
making offers to law school graduates, as distinguished from third-year law students, 
prior to the Sept. 20 start date for fall of 2004 was a violation of the regime’s rules.  
(Although a few judges appeared to believe that interviewing or making offers to law 
school graduates prior to the Sept. 20 start date for fall of 2004 was not a violation of the 
regime’s rules, the 2004 rules explicitly stated their coverage of law school graduates as 
well as third-year students (although, as noted just below, this feature of the regime was 
changed for fall of 2005).  See 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/Lawclerk/2004_Plan/2004_plan.asp (visited 
6/02/04).  In the fall of 2005, law school graduates were explicitly exempted from the 
start date regime.  See http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/hr/lc_hiring_faqs.pdf.)   17 
 
Table 5a:  Judges’ Reports of Adherence to Start Dates, Fall 2004 
      






















































































Source:  2004 Judge Survey.  The total number of judges responding to both the question 
about their impression of overall adherence to the start date for scheduling interviews and 
the question about their impression of overall adherence to the start dates for conducting 
interviews and making offers was 104.  The total number of judges responding to the 
question about their impression of adherence within their own Circuit to the start date for 
scheduling interviews was 52.  The total number of judges responding to the question 
about their impression of adherence within their own Circuit to the start date for 
conducting interviews and making offers was 49. 
   18 
 
Table 5b:  Judges’ Reports of Adherence to Start Dates, Fall 2005 
 






















































































Source:  2005 Judge Survey.  The total number of judges responding to the question 
about their impression of overall adherence to the start date for scheduling interviews was 
86.  The total number responding to the question about their impression of overall 
adherence to the start dates for conducting interviews and making offers was 83.  The 
total number of judges responding to the question about their impression of adherence 
within their own Circuit to the start date for scheduling interviews was 40.  The total 
number of judges responding to the question about their impression of adherence within 
their own Circuit to the start date for conducting interviews and making offers was 42. 
 
 
Consistent with this evidence from our judge survey responses, our 
student survey responses point to a substantial amount of interviewing and 
offering of clerkships prior to the start dates for the law clerk market.  We focus 
our discussion on the subset of student responses from students who applied for 
federal appellate clerkships (rather than all students who applied for federal 
clerkships at either the appellate or the district court level) to maximize 
comparability with our judge survey data.
62   
                                                 
62   We received a total of 544 student responses in 2004 and a total of 550 student 
responses in 2005.  See the Appendix.  Of course, a substantial set of the respondents did 
not apply for federal judicial clerkships at all.  Among those who did apply for federal 
clerkships, most, but not all, applied to at least some federal appellate clerkships.  As   19 
 
 
Tables 6a and 6b report the dates at which students responding to our 
questions about hiring timing were first contacted to schedule interviews, were 
first interviewed, and first received clerkship offers; the shaded fields indicate 
behavior that is inconsistent with the start dates specified in Table 4.  As Tables 
6a and 6b show, in both fall of 2004 and fall of 2005 approximately one-third of 
responding students received their first invitations to interview before the start 
dates for the scheduling of interviews (31% of respondents in 2004 and 34% of 
respondents in 2005).  Each year approximately one-quarter had their first 
interviews before the start dates for interviews (23% of respondents in 2004 and 
28% of respondents in 2005), and about one in eight responding students received 
their first clerkship offer before the start dates for offers (12% of respondents in 
each year).  As noted above, any selection bias in responses would tend to suggest 
that the true level of departures from the start dates is, if anything, higher than 
these figures suggest.  
 
  Table 6a:  Date of Students’ First Scheduling of Interviews,  
First Interviews, and First Offers, Fall 2004 
   


































































Source:  2004 Student Survey.  The table reflects responses from students who applied 
for federal appellate clerkships.  The total number of students in this category who 
responded to the question about when their first interview was scheduled was 154; the 
total number who responded to the question about when their first interview took place 
was 148; and the total number who responded to the question about when they received 
their first offer was 128.  The shaded areas in the table reflect behavior that is 
inconsistent with the start dates specified in Table 4.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
noted in the text, we focus on those who applied to at least some federal appellate 
clerkships to maximize comparability with our judge survey data.   20 
 
Table 6b:  Date of Students’ First Scheduling of Interviews,  
First Interviews, and First Offers, Fall 2005 
   

































































Source:  2005 Student Survey.  The table reflects responses from students who applied 
for federal appellate clerkships.  The total number of students in this category who 
responded to the question about when their first interview was scheduled was 133; the 
total number who responded to the question about when their first interview took place 
was 134; and the total number who responded to the question about when they received 
their first offer was 117.  The shaded areas in the table reflect behavior that is 
inconsistent with the start dates specified in Table 4. 
 
 
Overall, then, our student responses, like our judge responses, suggest a 
substantial amount of non-adherence to the start dates in Table 4.
63  T h e s e  
                                                 
63   Responses to an additional set of questions on our judge survey for fall of 2004 
further corroborate the conclusion in the text.  Our 2004 survey asked judges whether 
they conducted their first interviews and extended their first offers (1) before Sept. 7, the 
start date for the transmittal of applications to judges’ chambers; (2) between Sept. 7 and 
Sept. 12, the period during which applications could be reviewed before the scheduling of 
interviews; (3) between Sept. 13 and Sept. 19, the period during which interviews could 
be scheduled, (4) between Sept. 20 and 26, the first week during which interviews could 
be conducted and offers could be made, and (5) after Sept. 26.  (In our 2005 judge 
survey, the date ranges specified inadvertently did not correspond to the start dates for the 
various stages of the law clerk hiring process, so we do not have comparable information 
from the responses to that survey.)  The table below reports responding judges’ answers 
to these questions.  As in Tables 6a and 6b in the text, the shaded fields below indicate 
behavior that is inconsistent with the start dates specified in Table 4 for fall of 2004.  As 
the table below shows, one-third of judges responding to the 2004 survey question about 
when they commenced interviewing reported having commenced their interviewing prior 
to the specified Sept. 20 start date for conducting interviews in fall of 2004.  Over one-
fifth of judges (21%) responding to the 2004 survey question about when they 
commenced making offers reported having commenced making offers prior to the 
specified Sept. 20 start date for offers in fall of 2004.  These numbers reflect interactions   21 
 
findings mark a clear contrast with the proclamation at the end of 2004 by the 
judges responsible for the current regime that the “vast majority of judges 
complied with the 2004 Plan,” with only “several” judges going earlier than the 
start dates;
64 in 2004 as well as 2005, our survey evidence suggests a very 
substantial degree of non-adherence to the start dates.    
 
 
C.  Stabilization of the Market at a Pattern of Mixed Adherence and Non-
Adherence 
 
“How did you go bankrupt?” 
“Two ways.  Gradually, and then suddenly.”
65  
 
Departures from the start dates specified by the current federal law clerk 
hiring regime have important potential implications for the ability of the law clerk 
market to preserve the benefits of this regime.  While the good news from 2004 
and 2005 is that the substantial set of judges who violated the start dates generally 
did so by days or weeks rather than months (or years), the history of previous 
failures to reform the timing of the clerkship market, described in section A 
above, naturally raises the question of what the current ripple of subversive 
behavior may bode for the longer term prospects of the current regime. 
 
In some markets, a nontrivial level of non-adherence to a particular regime 
precipitates a growing cycle in which adherence grows smaller and smaller over 
time.
66  Indeed, in the clerkship market itself, when Judges Becker and Breyer 
circulated a proposal for a 1989 start date of March 1 of the second year of law 
school, they indicated that the proposal would only be enacted if 85% of the 
                                                                                                                                     
with law school graduates as well as third-year students and, thus, are higher than the 
numbers in Tables 6a and 6b. 
 





Sept. 7-12  Sept. 13-19 Sept. 20-26  After Sept. 
26/Not yet 
























Source:  2004 Judge Survey.  The total number of judges responding to the question 
about when they commenced interviewing was 116.  The total number responding to the 
question about when they commenced making offers was 118.  
64   Harry T. Edwards and Edward R. Becker, Memorandum, “Assessment of the 2004 
Law Clerk Hiring Plan and Suggestions for the Future” (November 10, 2004). 
65   Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises (1926). 
66   See, e.g., AJPR, supra note 7, at 850-51(describing the market for medical residents 
in the 1940s).   22 
 
judges agreed to adhere to it.
67  When only 75% agreed to do so, this proposal was 
shelved.
68  This experience is consistent with the view that if the number of 
judges willing to adhere to a proposal is below some critical level, the proposal, if 
enacted nonetheless, may engender a downward spiral of non-adherence.   
 
An example of this type of dynamic is Thomas Schelling’s “Dying 
Seminar.”
69  A faculty member organizes a group of 25 people for a weekly event.  
The first week, the vast majority show up.  But some initial participants are 
unwilling to continue attending given that a few of the initial invitees did not 
participate.  Once these participants stop attending, others may drop out in 
response, and the seminar may soon fail to draw anyone.   
 
Notwithstanding this dynamic, we explore below – drawing on existing 
economic analysis of other markets – several theories under which the current 
pattern of mixed adherence and non-adherence to the start dates for the law clerk 
market could reflect a stable long-run equilibrium in this market.  Perhaps some 
judges are willing to adhere to the start dates despite their awareness – clearly 
reflected in the survey responses reported above – of violations by a substantial 
proportion of their colleagues.  As one judge opined in responding to our 2005 
survey, “The key to the success of the system is the realization that 100% (or even 
93%) adherence isn’t necessary.”
70  Under what theories can some level of non-
adherence to a start date regime in fact be sustainable in a long-run equilibrium? 
 
 
1.    The Potential Role of Psychological Break Points 
 
Conceivably the degree and scope of non-adherence to the start dates for 
the law clerk market are limited by a sort of psychological break point associated 
with the start of the third year of law school.  Perhaps law school administrators 
will be reluctant to send transcripts, professors will be reluctant to send 
recommendations, and judges will be reluctant to interview and make offers 
during the summer before the third year of law school, as opposed to after the 
school year commences.  In addition, the choice of Labor Day as the start date for 
the market makes prior actions by either students or judges very conspicuous as 
violations of the guidelines.  A hopeful view is that these design factors might 
create a “break point” in timing that helps to stabilize the market.  Although 
                                                 
67   See Breyer, Becker and Calabresi, supra note 34, at 209. 
68   See id. 
69   Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 91-94 (1978).  For game theory 
models of this phenomenon in a job market setting that is relevant to the clerkship 
market, see generally Ettore Damiano, Hao Li and Wing Suen, Unraveling of Dynamic 
Sorting, Rev. Econ. Stud. (forthcoming); Hao Li and Wing Suen, Self-Fulfilling Early 
Contracting Rush, 45 Int’l Econ. Rev. 301 (2004).  Unraveling in these models produces 
a Nash equilibrium in which everyone violates the start dates.  
70   2005 Judge Survey #16.   23 
 
selective colleges place considerable emphasis on early application programs for 
college admissions, for instance, no college customarily solicits applications prior 
to the start of twelfth grade.
71   
 
However, it is easy to overstate the importance of seemingly obvious 
break points.  In the markets for college athletes and medical residents, for 
example, cutthroat competition led to commitment for college athletic 
scholarships to students in the eighth grade and to the recruitment of medical 
students for subspecialties while they were still taking basic medical classes – 
well before any reasonable break point in terms of information necessary for 
sensible matching.
72  Similarly, the shift in timing to early in the second year of 
law school for the clerkship process in the pre-2002 period surpassed most 
reasonable break points previously suggested by observers and participants.
73  
Moreover, in the market for law clerks, the timing of the current break point 
means that the break point is many months after the latest relevant new 
information (grades and recommendations from the second semester of the second 
year of law school) has become available.  A further discouraging factor is that 
summer interviews would undoubtedly be convenient for many applicants.
74    For 
all of these reasons, the case for some sort of psychological barrier that would 
limit a significant subset of market participants from moving prior to Labor Day 
does not seem strong. 
 
 
2.    The Potential Role of Market Segmentation 
 
                                                 
71   Christopher Avery, Andrew Fairbanks, and Richard Zeckhauser, The Early 
Admissions Game (2003).  
72   The best-known story of early recruiting in college basketball is of Damon Bailey, 
who made a verbal commitment to attend Indiana University in the 8
th grade.  This case is 
commonly cited as a prime reason that the NCAA revised its rules to limit the timing of 
athletic recruiting.  See http://espn.go.com/nfl/s/2002/1218/1479044.html.  For discussion 
of the timing of the medical market prior to the current system of matching for 
subspecialties, see Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns 
and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. Pol. Econ. 991 (1984), and Roth, 
Alvin E.  “The origins, history, and design of the resident match,” JAMA. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, vol. 289, No. 7, February 19, 2003, 909-912.. 
73     Most  famously,  Judge  Kozinski  confidently pronounced in a 1991 article that 
February or March of the second year of law school was a “natural breakpoint” before 
which (because of the grades and law review election results emerging at that time) 
judges would not be willing to hire.  See Kozinski, supra note 17, at 1710.  However,  
within a few years the market was moving at the beginning of the fall of the second year 
of law school, well before this “breakpoint.”  See AJPR, supra note 7, at 830-33. 
74   As one judge responding to our 2005 survey put it, “[N]ot all judges are on the coasts 
or in large metropolitan areas. An applicant cannot very easily ‘drop in’ to my chambers.  
Summer interviews following the completion of two full years of law school should be 
encouraged.”  2005 Judge Survey #2.   24 
 
The present pattern of adherence and non-adherence to the start dates for 
the law clerk market could also be sustainable in a long-run equilibrium if the 
market has become segmented, with one segment of the market moving prior to 
the start dates and other segments of the market moving after these dates.  For 
instance, some students might focus their attention on one particular subset of 
clerkships in their applications, while other students might concentrate their 
attention on a wholly different set of clerkships.  Once a few judges in an “early 
segment” of the market violated the start dates, others in that same segment of the 
market would have tremendous incentive to move early as well, but the other 
segment could remain largely unaffected and could continue to adhere to the start 
dates.  
 
One possibility is that the clerkship market has become segmented, at least 
to some degree, by the political background or philosophy of judges.
75  In our 
initial study of the clerkship market in 1998-2000, we considered asking judges – 
who are not asked for their names – for the political party of the President who 
nominated them, but we ultimately determined that we should not include this 
question; we followed the same tack in our present set of surveys.  Thus, our 
survey responses provide no quantitative data that could bear upon the possibility 
of political segmentation.  Very substantial information about individual judges 
(by name, so that political background or philosophy could be ascertained) is 
available on a heavily visited clerkship blog site,
76 but, unfortunately, most of the 
posts do not specify whether behavior on the stated dates was undertaken with 
respect to law school graduates (in compliance with the law clerk hiring regime) 
or third year students (in violation of the regime).
77  If, in fact, there is 
segmentation along political lines, then the market’s long-run equilibrium could 
involve limited adherence to the start dates for clerk hiring in one segment of the 
market and widespread adherence in the other.  On this account, students focused 
on (say) “conservative” judges would apply, and frequently be hired, before the 
start dates, while students focused on “liberal” (say) judges would apply, and 
generally be hired, in accordance with the start dates. 
 
Another possible form of market segmentation involves geography or 
court circuit.  From Tables 5a and 5b above we know that in the overwhelming 
                                                 
75   As one student observed on a survey response, “[I]t seems as if the 
republican/conservative judges were more likely to ‘break the rules’ than the 
democrat/liberal judges.  It might be that they have far less allegiance (or deference) to 
Judge Edwards meaning that it might be a good idea for Judge Edwards to reissue the 
rules along with a conservative cosponsor.”  2005 Student Survey #105. 
76   See http://lawschoolclerkship.blogspot.com (visited 1/4/2007). 
77   Some might also worry (perhaps without great reason) about the reliability of the 
blog postings.  In contrast to the questions in our surveys, which ask about judges’ and 
students’ own personal experiences and opinions, the blog postings (e.g., “Wilkinson is 
done,” “Hall has finished hiring”) may reflect gossip students have heard as opposed to 
events witnessed or experienced by them personally.   25 
 
majority of (if not all) circuits there is at least some non-adherence among judges; 
in 2005, for instance, over 80% of responding judges reported that at least one 
federal appellate judge in their Circuit did not adhere to the start date for 
conducting interviews and making offers, while 87% reported that at least one 
federal appellate judge in their circuit did not adhere to the start date for 
scheduling interviews (Table 5b).  Behavior reported by such an overwhelming 
portion of responding judges as happening within their own circuit is hard to 
reconcile with a strong version of the geographic or court circuit segmentation 
theory.  Nonetheless, this evidence cannot entirely disconfirm the theory at hand 
because it is conceivable that non-adherence by one or even two judges within a 
particular geographic area or circuit – perhaps particularly if the non-adherence is 
by senior judges – could be consistent with a general norm or practice of 
adherence within that geographic area or circuit.  Thus, ultimately, segmentation 
by geography or court circuit – like the political segmentation theory discussed 
above – is, while not confirmable with the data we have available, also not 
inconsistent with that data.
78 
 
Note that an extreme form of the “market segmentation” would have the 
market sub-divided a large number of times; we discussed above the example of 
the market for gastroenterology fellows, where markets became highly localized 
over time. In such cases, as discussed above, the key advantages of having 
markets at all are lost.  The sort of segmentation discussed here, by contrast, 
potentially involves much larger subsectors of the market (and much less fine-
grained segmentation) and, thus, could preserve many of the advantages of 
markets as an allocation mechanism. 
 
 
3.    The Potential Role of Informal Understandings 
 
A different – and obviously much less benign – form of stabilization 
around the current pattern of reported adherence and non-adherence would 
involve increasing departure from the spirit of the start dates even among those 
adhering to the letter of these dates.  Our surveys did not specifically ask about 
this type of issue, but, nonetheless, a number of student respondents in 2005 
                                                 
78   Our judge surveys did ask judges for their circuit, and thus in principle it is possible 
to examine whether reported adherence varies by circuit, but because of the relatively 
small number of judges in each circuit together with our approximately 50% response 
rate, we are not comfortable drawing inferences from observed patterns across circuits, 
simply because the (for instance) six judges out of twelve judges who responded from 
Circuit A could represent a very different sample than the six judges out of twelve who 
responded from Circuit B.  That said, if one looks at data on adherence versus non-
adherence across circuits, there is presently no apparent pattern of more pronounced 
adherence in some geographic or circuit segments of the market.  While we do not report 
this data because of its very limited reliability in our view, it is available from us on 
request.   26 
 
specifically referred to the practice of market participants’ following the start 
dates in a formal fashion while actually violating the spirit of the rules.  As Table 
7 reveals, some such violations were quite blatant.  As one student respondent 
summarized the dynamic, “Many judges will nominally ‘follow the rules’ but will 
also communicate with applicants through a ‘back channel’ or will do everything 
short of ‘officially’ scheduling an interview or making an offer.”
79  
 
Table 7: Student Reports of Departures from the Spirit (Though Not the 
Letter) of the Start Dates  
 
Survey   Comment 
2005 
Survey #1 
[S]everal judges called me before Sept. 15 [the date on which interviews 





I technically did not receive any interviews until Thursday, Sep. 15th 
(the first ‘official’ day that interview offers could be made).  However, 
at least 4 judges either emailed me or called me between Sep 9th and 
13th to say that they were ‘very interested’ in my application, even 




[Judge X] required that I have an ‘informal conversation’ with one of his 
clerks around September 9 or so (well before the hiring timeline 
permitted contact with chambers) before he would consider inviting me 




[A]n e-mail was sent [to me on September 12] letting me know I would 
be getting an invitation to interview on the 15
th [the date on which 




[Judge X’s] clerk responded to me in part as follows: ‘[Judge X] has 
asked me to let you know that he is extremely interested in interviewing 
you.  He has decided not to depart from the official hiring schedule, so 
he won’t call you to schedule until next week, but he’d like to interview 
you the first day that the rules allow.’ 
Sources:  2004 Student Survey; 2005 Student Survey. 
 
 
These sorts of informal in-advance understandings have close analogues in 
other markets – markets in which such informal understandings have largely 
undermined start dates even though those dates were formally followed.  In the 
case of postseason college football bowls before the current Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS) was in place, for instance, teams and bowls were required by the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association to wait until a specified day, called “Pick 
‘Em Day,” before making arrangements for who would play whom in the major 
post-season bowls.
80   However, despite formal adherence to Pick ‘Em Day, 
informal agreements were reached weeks in advance of the specified date.
81  A 
similar illustration comes from the market for Japanese university graduates, who 
                                                 
79   2005 Student Survey #87. 
80   See Roth and King, supra note, at 1009. 
81   See id. at 1009-12   27 
 
are not permitted to be formally hired well in advance of their graduation dates.  
Despite formal adherence to the designated start dates, informal understandings, 
called naitei, are commonly reached well before graduation.   These 
understandings have an interesting means of enforcement:  firms schedule firm 
events for students on dates on which major examinations for other jobs (such as 
at the Finance Ministry) are held, with the informal job offers retracted for 
students who do not show up to the firm events.
82  Thus, the dynamics reflected in 
the student comments in Table 7 have clear counterparts in other markets in 
which start dates have been attempted in the past – markets in which informal 
understandings were not limited to dates for interviews (as in Table 7) but 
extended to the offer and acceptance process itself.  It is too early to know 
whether a similar pattern will ultimately emerge in the market for federal judicial 
law clerks.   
 
*     *     * 
 
Given the mixed pattern of adherence and non-adherence revealed by our 
data, the best hope for preserving the current regime for law clerk hiring and 
avoiding a downward spiral of non-adherence involves some sort of segmentation 
in the market.  The evidence from other markets is not necessarily encouraging on 
this score, but it remains possible that segmentation – most likely by potential 
orientation, geography, or court circuit – could avoid a trend of growing non-
adherence to the start dates for hiring law clerks.  We return to the prospect of 
market segmentation in Part IV below.  Without some sort of segmentation, the 
law clerk market is likely to return to a much earlier point in applicants’ careers. It 
is the effort to prevent this that has led many markets to be governed by a 




IV.  “Exploding Offers” and Compressed Timing of the Market 
 
I … had an [early morning] interview [on Sept. 22, the first day on which interviews 
were permitted], which resulted in an exploding offer.  The judge wanted an 
immediate response.  [H]e was my 2nd choice of those judges who invited me to 
interview  …  I was able to convince my 2nd choice judge [to give] me until the end 
of the day.  Then I rushed to catch a plane to [city X].  I checked into a seedy hotel 
long enough to shower and change suits, then headed to a [late afternoon] interview 
with the judge I thought was my top choice.  This judge explained that he had wanted 
                                                 
82   See id. at 1016. 
83   The use of a medical-type matching system has been proposed numerous times in 
previous analyses of the law clerk market.  See Epstein, supra note; Trenton H. Norris, 
The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: An Applicant’s Perspective on Bad Apples, 
Sour Grapes, and Fruitful Reform, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 765, 791-98 (1993); Oberdorfer and 
Levy, supra note, at 1098-1108; Wald, supra note, at 160-63.  Our own prior study 
proposed a modified version of the medical matching system, limited to clerkships that 
might precede (“feed in to”) Supreme Court clerkships; for a detailed discussion, see 
AJPR, supra note, at 871-84.   28 
 
to make decisions that first night, but that he had promised he would not fill his slots 
before interviewing [two applicants the following day].  I explained that he was my 
first choice but that I had an offer that exploded at the end of the day, and he took my 
cell number and agreed to make a decision with his current clerks …  I went back to 
the seedy hotel room to wait for his call.  Meanwhile my 2nd choice judge’s clerk 
left a message on my home machine at 6:30pm or so saying that the judge was 
wondering about my answer.  I continued to wait for the [top choice] judge’s call, all 
the while worrying that I would lose the offer with my 2nd choice judge if I didn’t 




I had 10 minutes to accept.
85 
 
[Judge X] called me to ask if I would be prepared to accept an offer on the spot if he 




[A]t 9:30am on [Sept. 22, the first day on which offers were permitted, Judge X] said 
I had until 8am the next day.  At 3pm on [the same day, Judge X’s] secretary called 
and said the judge really needed a response.  I negotiated with the secretary to get 1 
more hour to decide, promising to deliver an answer by 4pm.
87 
 
After interviewing with my top two appellate judges I had an interview with a district 
court judge who would only allow me to interview with him at the beginning of the 
week.  He extended me an offer at the end of my interview and gave me an hour to 
decide only after I told him I couldn’t make the decision without first at least talking 
to my husband since it would involve a move to a new city.  During that one hour I 
called the two appellate judges, both of whom happened to be on the bench at the 
time.  I did not hear back from either appellate judge, so I felt as though I had no 
choice but to accept the district judge’s offer since he was a wonderful man and it 
was a great position.  30 minutes after I accepted my first choice appellate judge 




While the current reform has succeeded in delaying the timing of hiring 
until the third year of law school for most law students, the prohibition of 
transactions prior to the start date has also compressed the process of matching 
market participants – for those who adhere to the dates – into an exceedingly short 
period.  Once the start gun goes off, the whole process is concluded very quickly 
for those who had not transacted prior to the start dates.  This is a result in 
significant part of the practice of “exploding offers,” which (as in the student 
                                                 
84   2005 Student Survey #154.  In the end, “I finally decided to call the top choice 
judge’s chambers.  The judge answered, explained that they had lost my cell number and 
were just planning an email and said it was a ‘no.’”  Id.  The student thereupon accepted 
with the student’s second choice judge.  See id. 
85   2005 Student Survey #64.  
86   2004 Student Survey #407.  
87   2005 Student Survey #183.  
88   2004 Student Survey #112.    29 
 
quotes with which we began this section) require students to respond extremely 
quickly when offered positions.  Indeed, in some cases, reflected in the third 
student quotation above, the response is required to be not only quick but also 
affirmative.  “Exploding offers” often require applicants to make decisions 
without knowing whether an offer from a preferred judge later in the applicant’s 
interview schedule would be obtained.  (And, as noted above, most commentators 
on the market for federal judicial law clerks are highly skeptical of participants’ 
ability to determine their ideal matches prior to interviews having been 
conducted.
89)  A particularly extreme account was given at the start of this article; 
a student checked voice mail after a 35-minute flight had landed and found three 
messages in quick succession – the first extending an offer, the second wondering 
about the student’s response, and the third retracting the offer.
90 
 
Such market compression, in which transactions occur extremely rapidly 
once the start date has been reached, is characteristic of markets with start dates.
91  
Indeed, as described in Part III.A above, judges experienced a dramatic version of 
this problem under the May 1 start-date regime attempted in the law clerk market 
in 1990.
92  With all the action compressed in time by the start dates, judges 
naturally – and reasonably – worry that if they give applicants any substantial 
measure of time in which to respond to offers, it will be difficult to find 
replacements if an offer is rejected.  As a consequence, judges require students to 
respond extremely quickly to offers.  Our discussion below presents survey 
evidence both on the frequency of exploding offers − which require very rapid 
answers by their recipients − and on the general degree to which clerkship 




A.   Exploding  Offers 
 
  Even the judges responsible for the start-date regime in Table 4 readily 
acknowledge the problem of exploding offers under this regime, but they do not 
appear unduly concerned, stating that “for all the years that we have been on the 
bench, judges have extended exploding offers to law clerk applicants.”
93  It is not 
clear to us, however, whether these or other judges are aware of how common the 
practice of exploding offers actually is under the current regime.   In both fall of 
2004 and fall of 2005, our survey asked judges, “What was the shortest time you 
gave any clerkship candidate to accept or reject a clerkship offer?”  As shown in 
the right-hand column of Table 8, we found that over one third of judges 
                                                 
89   See supra note 40 accompanying text.  
90   See text accompanying supra note 3. 
91   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 850-51, 863-64. 
92   See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.  
93   Harry T. Edwards and Edward R. Becker, Memorandum, “Assessment of the 2004 
Law Clerk Hiring Plan and Suggestions for the Future” (November 10, 2004).   30 
 
responding to this question gave 24 hours or less for a response.  (Again, note that 
any bias in those who chose to respond suggests that, if anything, this number 
understates the overall frequency of exploding offers.)  By comparison, when we 
asked judges an identical question in our study five years ago, “only” 23% of 
responding judges gave a day or less, as shown in the left-hand column of Table 
8.
94  Note that we do not assert that the overall frequency of exploding offers has 
increased under the current regime; given possible variation in practices across 
judges who chose to respond to our surveys five years ago and now, we cannot be 
sure that the increase among respondents reflects an underlying increase in the 
total population of judges.  What is clear, however, is that exploding offers are 
relatively commonplace in the present market for federal judicial law clerks. 
 
Table 8:  Time-Limited Offers 
    
  1998-1999 and 1999-2000 
markets 
2004-2005 and 2005-2006 
markets 
Within one day  23% 
 
34%  
Within two days  36% 
 
42%  









Sources:  1998-1999 and 1999-2000 Judge Surveys; 2004 and 2005 Judge Surveys 
(present study).  Each column reports the combined results for two years of survey 
responses, with each survey (rather than each year) weighted equally.  
 
 
B.    Market Compression in General 
 
Even beyond the phenomenon of exploding offers, the general degree of 
market compression around the start dates for the law clerk market is striking.  In 
the fall of 2005, for instance, half of responding students (51 of 103) who 
received their first clerkship offer on or after the start date for interviewing and 
making offers received the offer on the start date itself (Table 9).  And the clear 
majority of these students – nearly two-thirds – accepted their offers the very 
same day, so for these students the entire process was concluded on the opening 
                                                 
94   Table 8 in the text is similar to Table 6 in our prior article, but instead of reporting 
results separately for the two separate years examined in our prior study (as was done in 
Table 6) we aggregate the two years’ worth of data for purposes of Table 8, as our 
interest in the present article is not in comparing the two years from our previous study to 
each other, but in comparing the general pattern in those years to the pattern observed in 
the fall of 2004.  Table 8 also uses the terminology “within one day” and “within two 
days” instead of “within 24 hours” and “within 48 hours” because the newer terminology 
matches more closely with the phrasing usually employed by the judges themselves in 
responding to our surveys.   31 
 
day for interviewing and making offers.  What is more, among those who 
accepted offers on the opening day for interviewing and making offers, nearly 
half of these students had accepted by 1:00pm Eastern Standard Time.  As Table 
9 shows, there was also considerable compression in the timing of the market in 
2004, though not as much as in the 2005 survey responses; as noted above, we 
cannot draw any confident conclusions about changes over time from modest 
differences in answer patterns across our two years of surveys because of possible 
differences in the composition of the response pools, but the notion that 
compression might increase over time is not surprising in light of prior 
experiences with start date regimes in other markets.
95 
 
Table 9:  Market Timing
96 
    
  Fall 2004 market Fall 2005 market
First offer received on start date for 





First offer received after start date for 





Of first offers received on start date for 
interviewing and making offers, 
percentage accepted on start date 
42% 63% 
 
Sources:  2004 and 2005 Student Surveys.  The table reflects responses from students 
who applied for federal appellate clerkships.  
 
  
A clear corollary of the high level of market compression is judges’ 
intense interest in determining, before the start date for interviewing and making 
offers, not only the candidates in which the judges are most interested but how 
these candidates will respond to an offer.  While many judges typically content 
themselves with informal information gathering, through trusted professors or 
current (or former) clerks, about candidates’ level of interest, other judges resort 
to demands for explicit assurances from candidates that these candidates will 
accept an offer if one is forthcoming – as clearly illustrated by the third student 
quote at the beginning of this section. 
 
One of the most important consequences of the high market compression 
documented here is that it creates a strong incentive for market participants to 
move before the designated start dates, in an effort to avoid the severe congestion.  
Moving early gives a judge the opportunity to interview and consider multiple 
candidates without a fear that a candidate will be unavailable if the judge does not 
                                                 
95   See, e.g., AJPR, supra note 7, at 851 (discussing the market for medical residents). 
96   Table 9 focuses on activity on and after the start date for interviewing and making 
offers.  Tables 6a and 6b above provide information on interviewing and extending of 
offers prior to this start date.   32 
 
issue an offer immediately after the interview.  At least in other markets, such 
dynamics have made start dates ultimately unsustainable.
97  In the present market 
for federal judicial law clerks, however, it is conceivable that market 
segmentation of the sort discussed in Part III.C above will make the start dates 
sustainable.  It may be that compression – like non-adherence – is higher in some 
segments than in others.  If a segment has lower compression than the average 
levels reflected in Table 9 − perhaps because of norms against exploding offers
98 
− then, as just noted, this segment might also have lower non-adherence to the 
start dates for hiring law clerks. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Our analysis suggests a mixed message about the new market for federal 
judicial law clerks.  The timing of hiring has moved back considerably, which is 
broadly regarded as a positive development, but departures from the start dates for 
hiring law clerks − as well as exploding offers and high market compression − are 
apparent.  The good news about the timing of hiring makes it particularly critical 
to acknowledge and attempt to address the incipient (or more than that) problems 
that threaten to undermine the value of hiring later in students’ law school careers.  
The need is especially urgent given that, as described above, these are the very 
problems that have thwarted all past attempts at start date regimes in both the law 
clerk market and all other known markets that have suffered from problems of 
early hiring.   
                                                 
97    See generally Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth, Making Markets Thick: How 
Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance (working paper, 2006).  
Indeed, an experimental investigation of dynamics in a market structured like the market 
for federal judicial law clerks showed precisely this pattern.  See generally Ernan Haruvy, 
Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver, The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An 
Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market, 30 J. 
Econ. Dynamics and Control 457 (2006). That paper specifically notes that one potential 
obstacle to a centralized match for law clerks is a market culture in which many applicants 
feel unable to avoid making an early commitment to a judge who demands it. Any attempt 
to organize a match for law clerks would also have to attempt to moderate this part of the 
culture of the recruitment process. 




This Appendix briefly describes our survey approach.  Exactly as in our 
previous study, we surveyed both the federal appellate bench and law students 
from a few elite schools.
99  As noted in the text, our surveys were not 
professionally designed instruments; at the same time, we obtained good response 
rates and gathered information (from the surveys’ highly educated recipients) 
consisting mostly of answers to very straightforward factual questions. 
 
On the judge side, a six-page survey was sent by U.S. mail in December of 
2004 (regarding the fall 2004 market) and in February of 2006 (regarding the fall 
2005 market) to each active and senior member of the federal appellate bench, 
with a stamped, pre-addressed envelope for return of the completed survey.
100  
The judge author of this article sent the surveys with an accompanying cover 
letter, but responding judges were asked to send their responses to another of us 
(Jolls) rather than to the judge author because of confidentiality concerns.  As 
detailed in Table A1, we received responses from just over one-half of the federal 
appellate judges, similar to our response rate in our previous study, in 2004 and 
from just under one-half of the federal appellate judges in 2005.  In both years, 
responses from active versus senior judges were also similar in number to 
responses from these groups in our prior study.






                                                 
 
a   See AJPR, supra note 7, at 806-11, for a discussion of the reasons for choosing these 
pools of judges and students to survey. 
b  Parallel to our previous study, a small number of senior court of appeals judges from 
the Seventh Circuit were not surveyed because the sender of the survey (Posner), a judge 
on that Circuit, knew that they were no longer hiring law clerks.  See id. at 807 n.33. 
c   Our  response  rate from senior judges is lower this time than in our prior study 
because the number of senior judges on the federal appellate bench has increased 
dramatically.  In our prior study, there were 77 (in 1999) and 79 (in 2000) senior federal 
appellate judges.  See id. at 886.  As Table A1 shows, there were 99 in 2004 and 95 in 
2005.   34 
 
Table A1:  Judge Survey Response Rates by Seniority Status and Circuit 
 







% of surveyed 
judges responding 
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004  2005 
 
All judges  259 
 
253 135 116 52% 46% 
Active judges  160 
 
158 88  74 55%  47% 
Senior judges  99 
 
95 44 42  44%  44% 
Senior status not listed 
 
N/A N/A  3  (2)  N/A  N/A 
1
st Circuit  11 
 
10 7  6  64%  60% 
2
nd Circuit  23 
 
23 9  8  39%  35% 
3
rd Circuit  20 
 
20 16  9 80%  45% 
4
th Circuit  15 
 
14 3  5  20%  36% 
5
th Circuit  19 
 
18 11  9 58%  50% 
6
th Circuit  25 
 
24 15 11  60%  46% 
7
th Circuit  14 
 
14 7  7  50%  50% 
8
th Circuit  21 
 
20 12 14  57%  70% 
9
th Circuit  47 
 
47 28 22  60%  47% 
10
th Circuit  19 
 
19 7 11  37%  58% 
11
th Circuit  17 
 
17 8  5  47%  29% 
D.C. Circuit  11 
 
12 5  5  45%  42% 
Federal Circuit  17 
 
15 6  4  35%  27% 




For students, surveys were distributed in the fall of 2004 and again in the 
fall of 2005 to all third-year students at four law schools – Harvard, Stanford, 
University of Chicago, and Yale – both in hard copy to student mailboxes, with   35 
 
stamped, pre-addressed return envelopes, and electronically to student email 
accounts with the option to respond to the survey electronically.  Our response 
rate was 50% in fall of 2004 and 48% in fall of 2005 (Table A2). 
 
Table A2:  Student Survey Response Rates  
 
Number of students surveyed  Number and (in 
parentheses) percentage of 
students responding 
 







































Parallel to our prior study, our student survey starts by asking whether the 
responding student applied for federal court clerkships, and only students who had 
done so were directed to fill out the body of the survey.  Nonetheless, some of the 
responses by students in the body of the survey may relate to state court 
applications, even though those were not embraced in the opening question, 
because the students may have applied for those positions in addition to federal 
court clerkships.  As in our previous study, we did not choose to limit subsequent 
questions (such as “What was the date and time of your first interview?,” “What 
was the date and time of your first offer of a clerkship?,” and “Did you receive 
other clerkship offers before you rejected your first offer?”) to the federal court 
clerkships embraced in the opening question, but this could have produced 
misleading or incomplete answers, as opportunities might have affected the 
student’s situation in the market for federal court clerkships.  However, the 
implication of our approach is that the data described in the main text, while only 
for students who applied for federal court clerkships, may reflect events in the 
state court clerkship market as well. 
 
All surveys returned to us, both by judges and by students, were assigned 
numbers, which are used to identify the responses in our analysis in the main text. 
 
 
 
 
 